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NOTES
ASSET SECURITIZATION:
IS IT A RESOLUTION OPTION FOR
CHINA’S NON-PERFORMING LOANS?
I. INTRODUCTION
China’s banking industry has been straddled with a staggering number of non-performing loans (“NPLs”).1 These bad loans
were extended by China’s state banks to inefficient state-owned
enterprises (“SOEs”), as well as failed real estate projects during the time of economic overheating in the mid 1990s.2 In order to overhaul its fragile banking system, the Chinese government has taken a series of measures over the past decade to
clean up the balance sheets of four major state banks.3 One
significant step was the creation of four Asset Management
Companies (“AMCs”) in 1999, which purchased at face value
about USD170 billion of NPLs from four major state banks with
the ultimate task of disposing of these assets.4 To date, the
AMCs have recovered about a quarter of the transferred portfolio through various techniques including loan resale, public auction, debt restructuring, and debt to equity swaps.5 Recently,
with go vernmental support, the Chinese AMCs have also begun

1. The official NPL ratio at four major Chinese state banks was given in
1999 as 25% of the total loans outstanding. For several years, the government
denied the scale of the problem and dismissed unofficial estimates that put
the ratio at 40% or more of the total loans outstanding. See infra notes 35–39
and accompanying text. Nicholas Lardy, a China expert at the Brookings
Institution, however, recently estimated China’s NPLs to be USD500 billion,
or about 50% of the total. Casino Capital: China’s Financial Markets Are
Wild and Often Less Than Wonderful, in THE WEAKEST LINK : A S URVEY OF
ASIAN FINANCE 10, 12 (supplement to ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2003) [hereinafter
Casino Capital].
2. See infra notes 40–47 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
5. See Casino Capital, supra note 1, at 12.
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to explore asset securitization as an alternative for the expeditious and efficient resolution of NPLs under their charge.6
Asset securitization7 refers to a specific form of financial
transaction in which an originator pools certain types of illiquid
assets (typically loans or receivables) and transfers them to a
special purpose vehicle (“SPV”).8 The SPV, in turn, issues securities (usually bonds, but can also be equities) collateralized or
backed by the transferred assets.9 The SPV pays investors of
these asset backed securities (“ABSs”) interest and principal out
of the cash flow arising from the underlying assets.10 Investors
then purchase the securities based on their evaluation of the
transferred assets’ risk, without concern with the originator’s
financial condition.11
Securitization is beneficial to originators through risk transferring. For corporations, securitization offers a new and potentially cheaper form of financing.12 For financial institutions,
such as banks that hold large loan portfolio, securitization not
only provides alternative financing, but also allows them to address regulatory requirements, such as capital adequacy and
lending limits.13 Therefore, a financial institution originator
may achieve a good match between assets and liabilities.14
6. Interview with Kaisheng Yang, Chairman, China Huarong Asset Management Corporation, in Beijing, China (Jan. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Interview
with Yang].
7. In this Note, asset securitization and securitization are used interchangeably. For a general discussion on securitization, see TAMAR FRANKEL,
S ECURITIZATIONS : S TRUCTURED FI NANCING , FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSETBACKED S ECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 1999); S TEVEN L. S CHWARCZ, S TRUCTURED
FINANCE : A G UIDE TO THE P RINCIPLES OF ASSET S ECURITIZATION (3d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter S CHWARCZ, S TRUCTURED FINANCE ]; T HE S ECURITIZATION OF
FINANCIAL ASSETS (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1999); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72
TULANE L. REV . 101 (1997); Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996); and Steven L. Schwarcz, The
Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 S TAN. J.L. B US . & FIN. 133 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Alchemy].
8. S CHWARCZ, S TRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 1–3.
9. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 7, at 135.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. IAN H. GIDDY , ASSET S ECURITIZATION IN ASIA 2 (2000), available at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ABS/absasia.pdf.
13. According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, banks that
securitize assets are able to accomplish several objectives: (1) reduce regula-
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For investors, ABSs provide better yields than those on comparable corporate bonds and enable them to diversify their investment portfolios.15 In addition, the investors’ risk preferences may be accommodated through special deal structur es.16
Finally, since the ABS issues usually are large and have high
credit ratings as a result of credit enhancements, these securities tend to be liquid and may be actively traded in secondary
markets.17
In a typical asset securitization transaction, the SPV issues
securities backed by “good” assets with a proven track record of
repayment streams.18 During the period of 1989 to 1995, however, the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”), a special
agency sponsored by the United States (“U.S.”) government,
successfully utilized the asset securitization to dispose of underand non-performing loans taken over from failed savings and
loan associations.19 The U.S. experience has since inspired
some Asian economies, such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, to
employ securitization as a method to dispose of their bad bank
loans.20
This Note argues that given the magnitude and urgency of
China’s NPL problem, the AMCs should explore all possible
resolution methods, including securitization, to prevent their
portfolios from rapidly decreasing in value like a melting ice
cream.21 The Chinese AMCs, however, may only be able to utilize asset securitization to recover certain suitable NPLs, because there exist substantial obstacles to a large scale NPL setory capital requirements; (2) obtain an additional source of funding, generally
at lower cost; (3) enhance financial ratios; (4) manage portfolio risk; (5) diversify their portfolios.
See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING S UPERVISION,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: ASSET S ECURITIZATION 1 (2001), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca06.pdf.
14. GIDDY , supra note 12, at 2.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 3–4.
17. Id. at 3.
18. See S CHWARCZ, S TRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 1–2; see also
GIDDY , supra note 12, at 3.
19. See infra notes 156–58 and accompanying text.
20. See discussion infra Part V.
21. Kaisheng Yang called the value decrease of NPL portfolio as ”ice cream
effect:” the bad loans are like “an ice cream you are holding in your hand,
which, if you hold it too long, will melt away.” Interview with Yang, supra
note 6.
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curitization program in China. The most prominent hindrances
include the peculiar nature of Chinese NPLs, the immaturity of
the capital markets, and the inadequacy of China’s existing legal infrastructure.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of China’s banking
system and NPL problem. Part III then introduces the general
features of asset securitization along with a cost-benefit analysis. Part IV examines the desirability and feasibility of distressed loan securitization, followed by a case study of the RTC
securitization program. Part V discusses the securitization development in East Asia with some details on the Japanese and
Korean cases. Part VI considers the market conditions for NPL
securitization in China, identifying as securitizable certain
types of NPLs held by the Chinese AMCs. Part VII examines
China’s current legal and regulatory framework relevant to securitization, and proposes for special legislation to facilitate
securitization development. Part VIII concludes by stressing
that China must further liberalize its capital markets and establish a transparent legal system in order to pave the way for
launching NPL securitization market.
II. CHINA’S NON-PERFORMING BANKING LOANS
This Part first provides an overview of China’s banking system. It then discusses the seriousness of the NPL problem, as
well as its negative impact on the country’s financial stability
and economic growth. This Part ends with a review of the Chinese government’s step to attack the NPL problem.
A. Evolution of China’s Banking Industry
China’s banking sector saw considerable institutional transformation in the last two decades of the twentieth century.22
For a long time, China lacked a sophisticated banking system.
Until the early 1980s, the People’s Bank of China (“PBoC”) performed the mixed functions of both a central and an operational
bank. In 1984, the PBoC’s operational business, consisting
mainly of short-term industrial and commercial credit as well
as related payments (i.e., granting loans for working capital),
22. For a comprehensive discussion on the evolution of China’s banking
system, see NICHOLAS LARDY, CHINA ’S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION ch. 3
(1998).
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were assigned to a newly established state bank, the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”). Accordingly, PBoC
started to perform solely the functions of the nation’s central
bank. 23 ICBC, along with the Agricultural Bank of China
(“ABC”), China Construction Bank (“CCB”), and the Bank of
China (“BOC”), operated through the late 1980s and 1990s as
the four major so called “specialized” state banks (hereinafter
“the big four”), dominating the country’s financial landscape. 24
During the 1990s, the Chinese government accelerated the
process of the banking system reform. The Central Banking
Law enacted in 1995 formally granted the PBoC the legal authority to function as a central bank. Today, the PBoC holds
the role as the lead supervisor of China’s financial institutions.25 In addition, since 1994, the government began to transform the big four into commercial entities. At the same time,
the prior division of their business scope along the client sector
line gradually diminished, allowing more competition amo ng
the big four. Beginning in the mid 1980s, the government relaxed restrictions on the banking market entry, granting licenses to a number of new commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions. Foreign banks were also permitted to establish their operations in China, but were subject to severe
restriction on both geographic and sectoral scope of domestic
currency business.26 Up to the year 2000, only 32 licenses were
granted to foreign banks to handle such business, all of which
are in Shanghai and Shenzhen.27 An even smaller group of
them is allowed to borrow from and lend to local banks. When
23. Id. at 63–62.
24. Id. at 80.
25. A complex web of government authorities oversees the country’s banking activities. The regulatory framework can be generally broken down
among the PBoC, the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”), the China Securities
Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”), the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”), the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
(“MOFTEC”) and the State Economic and Trade Commission (“SETC”). Each
regulator, however, has individual preferences and objectives in its regulatory
duties. ERNST &YOUNG , AN OVERVIEW OF THE NON-PERFORMING ASSET M ARKET
IN THE PEOPLE ’S R EPUBLIC OF C HINA 10 (2001) (on file with the author) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG REPORT].
26. Karen Chan, Development in Banking Law 2000: Global Banking —
Asia/Pacific, 20 ANN. REV . BANKING L. 32, 42–43 [hereinafter Asian Banking
2000 Review].
27. Id. at 43.
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China acceded to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in the
end of 2001, it committed itself to opening up its financial sector
to the outside world. Accordingly, after a five -year transitional
period, the Chinese government will eliminate both geographic
and customer limitations on foreign banks in conducting the
local currency busine ss, and foreign banks will eventually enjoy
national treatment.28
Although the institutional landscape has become more complex,29 the Chinese banking sector remains underdeve loped,
even when compared to other Asian markets. The banking sector’s main clientele is the state sector. For example, state
banks extend most loans (about 80%) to state-owned enterprises, while the private sector receives less than 5% of total
lending.30 The services to their customers are limited to basic
deposit, lending, and transaction banking.31 Household depositors receive few financial services beyond maintaining their
savings accounts. In fact, basic retail banking services, such as
checking accounts for households, are rare, even in the largest
cities. Credit cards, home mortgages, and car loans are still in
their infancy stage. Meanwhile, other types of consumer credit
still do not exist.32
B.The NPL Problem
China’s effort to modernize its banking system has been burdened by mountains of bad loans sitting on the books of major
state banks.33 Chinese scholars estimate that the proportion of

28. Id.
29. Currently, the structure of China’s banking system consists of 4 state
commercial banks, 3 policy banks, 10 national joint-stock commercial banks, 4
asset management corporations, about 88 city-based commercial banks, 3,240
urban credit cooperatives, more than 41,500 rural credit cooperatives, and
approximately 162 foreign banks that maintained branches or representative
offices. ERNST & YOUNG REPORT, supra note 25, at 8.
30. The Long March to Reform China’s State Firms, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30,
2000, available at 2000 WL 8143861.
31. Stephen M. Harner, China Watch: Beijing Blocks the Banks, ASIAN
WALL S T. J., July 20, 2000, at J10, available at 2000 WL 23745833.
32. LARDY , supra note 22, at 82–83.
33. For a thorough discussion of China’s NPL problem, see Jianbo Lou,
China’s Bank Non-Performing Loan Problem: Seriousness and Causes, 34
INT’L L AW. 1147 (2000).
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NPLs34 to overall bank assets has ranged from 10–40%.35 In
1999, the governor of PBoC, Dai Xianglong, officially recognized
that the ratio of NPLs to total outstanding loans at the big four
was 25%.36 The Bank for International Settlements, in a 2002
report, estimated the NPLs accumulated by China’s big four to
be 42% of the total.37 This figure is comparable to the highest
levels of 40% to 60% for South Korea and Indonesia during the
height of the 1997-98 financial crisis.38 In 2001, Standard &
Poor’s (“S&P”), a credit rating agency, estimated that it would
take about USD540 billion, half of China’s annual GDP, to
properly recapitalize the big four.39
Although an in-depth discussion of the causes of China’s NPL
problem is beyond the scope of this Note, a brief summary is
helpful. Historically, the NPL problem roots from the prior regime of command economy. For decades during the pre-reform
era, state banks served as mere conduits for the quasi-fiscal
operations of government institutions, extending easy credit to
loss-making SOEs, providing subsidy loans for agricultural procurement programs, and financing a variety of public investment projects according to the needs of state planning.40
Banking reform did not prevent NPLs from snowballing.
While struggling to establish themselves as truly autonomous
entities, the state banks were only to find the impossibility of
34. The identification of NPLs referred to here is made under China’s old
three tier loan classification system. The total figure of NPLs includes loans
that were overdue for less than one year and might be recovered. The main
body of the portfolio, however, consists of doubtful and bad loans that would
have to be written off. Since 1998, a new five level system, more in line with
the international standard, has started to be implemented in the industry.
See id. at 1192 n.4.
35. Id. at 1147.
36. See id. See also Peter Montagnon and James Harding, Chinese Central-Bank Governor To Reduce Bad Debt, FIN . TIMES , Sept. 13, 1999, available
at 1999 WL 21147750.
37. GUONAN M A & BEN S.C. F UNG, CHINA’S ASSET M ANAGEMENT
CORPORATIONS 2 (Bank for International Settlements, Working Paper No. 115,
Aug. 2002), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work115.pdf [hereinafter BIS
WORKING PAPER}.
38. Id. See also, Review and Outlook: the Care and Feeding of China’s
Banks, ASIAN WALL S T. J., Oct. 7, 2002, at A11, available at 2002 WL
23018599 [hereinafter Review and Outlook].
39. Id.
40. Fred Hu, Sense of Urgency, A Race Against Time, ASIAN WALL S T ., Feb.
11, 2002, at J8, available at 2002 WL 3344150 [hereinafter Sense of Urgency].
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allocating credit purely based on commercial considerations.41
They continue to face strong, although perhaps less outright, 42
political pressure to rescue the financially deteriorating SOEs.43
Furthermore, the banks’ problem of lax internal credit risk control persists,44 even though most banks have begun to pay more
attention to the borrowers’ repayment capability and loan collateral’s quality. The lack of effective internal control and external oversight, coupled with the difficulty of obtaining reliable
financial information on the SOE borrowers, seriously constrained the ability of state banks to prudently assess credit
risk, resulting in the declining of their loan quality.45
In addition to the soft loans made to the loss producing state
owned factories, NPLs also include failed commercial real estate loans. In the mid 1990s, a time of economic overheating,
many Chinese banks lent excessively to commercial real estate
development projects, mainly in Shanghai, Beijing and some
other coastal cities.46 A considerable portion of such loans became nonperforming when the overbuilding resulted in a market collapse. 47
The NPL problem has a serious negative impact upon both
China’s banking reform and its overall economic growth. First,
the mounting NPL portfolios on the big four’s balance sheets
stand as a formidable obstacle to their true commercialization.
The huge amount of bad loans in fact contributed to the big
four’s profitability decline, undermining their competitiveness.
48
Significantly, the staggering figure of NPLs has already
41. Id.
42. In 1998, the PBoC terminated the long-standing credit ceiling system.
See Dai Xianglong, Wei Jianli Xiandai Jinrong Tixi, Jinrong Zhidu he Lianghao de Jinrong Chixu er Nuli [The Objectives of a New Round of Financial
Reform and Development], 2 Z HONGGUO JINRONG [C HINA FIN.] 6 (1998).
43. See Sense of Urgency, supra note 40 (pointing out that the fundamental
cause of the NPL problem lies in the deteriorating performance and loss making of many SOEs, the state banks’ main clientele). See generally L ARDY, supra note 22, Ch. 2.
44. Sense of Urgency, supra note 40.
45. Id.
46. See L ARDY , supra note 22, at 195–97.
47. See id.
48. The average profit margin of the big four during the period from 1995
to 1997 was only 0.26% and showed a decreasing tendency. In contrast, the
profitability of the ten new commercial banks during the same period was
1.70% and showed an increasing tendency. One of the reasons that these
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made the big four technically insolvent.49 Liquidity, however, is
currently not a problem facing China’s state banks. Two reasons explain this coexistence of technical insolvency and high
liquidity in the banking sector: (1) high domestic household savings,50 and (2) limited investment outlets in the underdeveloped
domestic capital markets.51 The big four are kept afloat mainly
on governmental support and the public’s confidence in state
banks.52 Given the weight the big four carry in the entire banking system,53 any wavering of public depositors’ faith could
cause a major bank failure, and the resultant systemic financial
debacle would lead China into turmoil.54
The NPL problem also stymies China’s real economy. On the
microeconomic level, the accumulation of NPLs on banks’ balance sheet distorts the incentives for both banks and SOEs.
The so-called “adverse selection” influencing banking lending
decisions55 fostered the SOEs’ excessive reliance on state banks,
diminishing their willingness and capability to adjust production in response to market signals.56 From a macroeconomics
newcomers outperformed the big four is that they had a very low NPL level.
It is estimated that the emerging commercial banks have NPLs accounting for
only 2.3% of their outstanding loans. See Lou, supra note 33, at 1148, nn.14–
15.
49. See L ARDY , supra note 22, at 119.
50. See Lou, supra note 33, at 1159–62. In 1997, bank deposits and savings accounted for more than 80% of all household financial assets, securities
only accounted for approximately 10%, and cash and other assets less than
10%. See Statistics Department of the PBoC, An Analysis of the Direct Finance of Chinese Enterprises, 9 C HINA FIN. (Beijing) 24 (1998).
51. See Lou, supra note 33, at 1159–62.
52. Commentators have observed that China’s low national debt, high savings rate, and reform momentum have so far forestalled a disastrous crisis of
confidence in the banking system. See, e.g., Hugo Restall, Examining Asia:
Selling Debt, Restarting Reform, ASIAN W ALL S T. J ., Dec. 19, 2001, at J11,
available at 2001 WL 29659268.
53. As of 1998, the big four held 68% of the nation’s deposits, 77% of all
loans, and 75% of total banking assets, and employed 66% of those working in
the banking sector. See Lou, supra note 33, at n.23.
54. See L ARDY , supra note 22, at 201–02.
55. See Lou, supra note 33 at 1151–52
56. The “adverse selection” refers to the distortion in the process of loan
decision making. Because of the heavy exposure of state banks to SOE borrowers and the large amount of NPLs in proportion to the bank capital, the
bank managers, in fear of the banks’ own failure, were forced to extend new
workout loans to the ailing SOEs enabling them to service the existing outstanding debts. The managers of highly leveraged SOEs, on the other hand,
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perspective, the soundness of China’s financial sector has a major influence on the health of the overall economy. 57 China has
a bank-centric financial system, where banks play a key role of
channeling funds from households to industry and commerce.
The banks’ share of financial intermediation is almost nine tenths, a ratio exceeding that of almost all other Asian economies.58 Any contraction of bank credit therefore could significantly affect China’s real economic growth. Some economists,
for example, believe that the 1998 economic slowdown in China
was partially due to the banking sector stress caused by the
cautiousness of banks in their lending in response to the alarm
of the Asian financial crisis.59
C. Steps to Resolve the NPL Problem
In the mid-1990s, the Chinese government began taking
steps aimed at reversing the deterioration of state banks loan
assets. It recognized that one reason for the existence of nonrecoverable loans was go vernment pressure on state banks to
make loans to politically important SOEs without giving regard
to their repayment capability. As a result, the government set
up three policy banks in 1994 to take over the pure policy lending function from the big four.60 The government hoped that
after creating these new policy banks, the big four would be run
along more commercial lines. Subsequently, the 1997–1998
financial crisis that afflicted many of China’s East Asian
neighbors awakened the Chinese leaders to the dangers that a
fragile banking sector could pose to the country’s financial security and economic development.61 Although China averted a
crisis largely due to its financial insulation,62 the government
realized the urgent need to take sweeping measures in order to
avert a systemic financial debacle. A significant step was taken
had no incentive to scrutinize their projects or to promote the firms’ profitability, because they knew that banks have no choice but to keep lending. Id.
57. Id. at n.33 (citing literature discussing a significant correlation between financial development and growth in China and other countries).
58. See L ARDY , supra note 22, at 16.
59. See Lou, supra note 33, at 1153.
60. See Review and Outlook, supra note 38.
61. In late 1997, a top-level national financial conference was held in Beijing in response to the rapidly unfolding Asian financial crisis. See Sense of
Urgency, supra note 40.
62. See L ARDY , supra note 22, at 197–98.

File: CAO Base Macro Final.doc

2003]

Created on: 3/24/2003 7:12 PM

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:27 AM

ASSET SECURITIZATION FOR CHINA

575

in 1998, when the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) issued RMB270
billion (USD33 billion) of bank restructuring bonds to recapitalize the big four, boosting their capital ad equacy ratios to the
internationally accepted level of 8%.63
However, with little change in the incentive structure at both
the state banks and the SOEs, bank loan quality continued to
decline and the big four’s capital once again evaporated.64 Consequently, the top priority of China’s financial reform agenda
was to promptly resolve the NPL problem. In 1999, the Chinese
government created four asset management corporations (one
for each of the big four),65 taking a page from the U.S. experience a decade earlier after the savings and loans crisis.66 The
AMCs purchased at book value from the big four at total of
RMB1.3 trillion (USD169 billion) NPLs extended before the end
of 1995.67 To finance this purchase, MOF issued RMB10 billion
(USD1.2 billion) of 10-year bonds for each of the four AMCs,
and PBoC also provided cash credit.68 This massive transfer of
NPLs from the big four’s balance sheets to that of the AMCs
effectively provided a second round of recapitalization for the
big four.69
63. See Review and Outlook, supra note 38. See also, Jun Ma, Financial
Liberalization: Slow and Steady, 28 CHINA BUS . REV . 1216 (May 1, 2001),
available at 2001 WL 13260974.
64. See Review and Outlook, supra note 38.
65. These AMCs are Huarong Asset Management Company for ICBC,
China Xinda Asset Management Company for CCB, China Great Wall Asset
Management Company for ABC, and China Orient Asset Management Company for BOC. See BIS WORKING P APER, supra note 37, at 1.
66. China modeled its AMCs along the lines of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) created in 1989 by the United States government. See supra
note 157 and accompanying text.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 4.
69. The final cost to the Chinese government of the eventual write-offs plus
the interest payments on the bonds could easily reach RMB 1 trillion
(USD121 billion). Fitch IBCA, in their 2000 Sovereign Debt Rating Report,
estimated that the worst-case scenario based on systemic NPLs of 40% and a
30% recovery rate would suggest a one-off charge equal to 20–25% of 1999
GDP. This scenario would raise the public debt-to-GDP ratio to 40–50%,
roughly on par with Thailand, while higher interest payments could widen the
budget deficient by an estimated 1–2% of GDP. Such a huge burden, which
may still be substantially understated, would without doubt considerably
strain the government’s fiscal resources, even though the majority of the costs
will not need to be realized until the AMC bonds are redeemed at maturity in
10 years. ERNST & YOUNG REPORT , supra note 25, at 18.
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The Financial Asset Management Company Regulation
(“AMC Regulation”) promulgated in November 2000 by the
State Council, the executive branch of the central government,
subjects the AMCs to the concurrent supervision of the PBoC,
MOF, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(“CSRC”).70 The AMC Regulation delegates the AMCs with an
ultimate task of recovering the transferred bad loans to the
fullest extent.71
Major disposition options granted by the government to the
AMCs include debt-to-equity swaps (“DESs”), loan resale, and
debt restructuring.72 Besides domestic sales, DESs have been
one of the most significant actions taken by the AMCs to resolve
bad loans. By the end of 2000, the four AMCs purchased
RMB1, 488 billion (USD483.8 billion) of NPLs and completed
587 swaps.73 DES deals completed by the AMCs, however, have
received much criticism.74 The DESs were conducted based on
the assumption that relieving the SOEs from the burden of debt
servicing would improve their financial positions because many
of them were highly overleveraged.75 It was hoped that through
swaps the SOEs could eventually make public equity offerings
to pay back the creditors turned shareholders, the AMCs, with
their newly raised capitals. While this strategy may be effective in cases where the companies were financially distressed
but potentially viable, there is a real danger that in many other
cases the debt embedded SOEs may turn the DESs into a shell
game of debt forgiveness.76 Experts have pointed out that a
change in SOE capital structure would not by itself improve the
70. Financial Asset Management Company Regulation, art. 4 (Nov. 20,
2000), available at http://www.chamc.com.cn/English/index.asp.
71. Id. art. 3.
72. Id. art. 10.
73. Huarong has bought RMB505.6 billions (USD61.1 billion) NPLs, and
completed 333 debt-for-equity swaps, Xinda RMB370 billion (USD44.7 billion), 168 swaps, Orient RMB266.5 billion (USD32.2 billion), 65 swaps, and
Great Wall RMB345.8 billion (USD41.8 billion), 21 swaps. Nicholas Howson,
The AMCs’ Debt-for-equity Swaps: Opportunity for Foreign Capital?, 28 CHINA
BUS . REV . 56 (2001).
74. See, e.g., id; Review and Outlook, supra note 38; Fred Hu, China’s
Banking Reform: Pitfalls Ahead, ASIAN WALL S T. J., Nov. 24, 1999, at J8,
available at 1999WL-WSJA 30190857 [hereinafter Pitfalls Ahead].
75. The SOE average debt-to equity ratio is estimated to be in excess of
400% by some measures. See id.
76. Id.
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managers’ behavior or put the ailing companies on sound footing. Given the lack of meaningful means for the AMCs to enforce their shareholder rights, delinquent SOE borrowers have
a strong incentive to abuse DESs to evade debts, further contaminating the already weak credit culture in China’s state sector economy.77
The AMCs have also used portfolio sale to recover NPLs. Until recently, the AMCs made only a few sale transactions to domestic buyers.78 Late in 2001, Huarong Asset Management
Corporation (“Huarong”), the largest of the four AMCs in China,
nailed down a landmark auction sale with two groups of major
international investment banks.79 This first international NPL
sale in the country80 was hailed by financial analysts as “a
breakthrough for the management of distressed assets in
China.”81 A year later, near the end of 2002, Huarong finally
won approval of the deal by China’s relevant financial authorities, including the PBoC, MOF and MOFTEC.82 The foreign
77. Id.
78. ERNST AND Y OUNG REPORT, supra note 25, at 18.
79. The AMCs purchased NPLs from the big four at the loans’ face value,
perhaps reflecting the Chinese government’s hesitation to recognize the low
recoverability of the NPLs. Outside observers pointed out that this no discount transfer cast a serious cloud over the valuation of any further asset
transfer by the AMCs to investors, because few buyers would purchase the
NPLs at anything close to the face value, with no discount given the assets’
real value. Edward S. Steinfeld, Free Lunch or Last Supper? China’s DebtEquity Swaps In Context, 27 CHINA BUS . REV . 2227 (2000).
80. China Completes Initial NPL Sale, BUS . WORLD , Dec. 13, 2001, available at LEXIS News.
81. James Kynge, Consortium Agrees Deal Over Chinese NPLs, FIN. TIMES ,
Nov. 30, 2001, at 31, available at LEXIS News.
82. Foreign Capital Allowed To Handle Non-Performing Assets in China,
ASIA PULSE, Dec. 3, 2003, available at LEXIS News [hereinafter Foreign Capital Allowed].
With the green light from regulators, two joint ventures are planned to be
launched in economic development zones in Beijing or Shanghai. The First
United AMC, founded by Huarong and a Morgan Stanley-led investment
banking group will be responsible for resolving four packages of NPLs
amounting to RMB10.8 billion (or USD1.30 billion), which covers problem
loans in 254 companies in 18 provinces. The Rongsheng AMC will be
launched by Huarong and Goldman Sachs and in charge of a package of
RMB1.97 billion NPLs (or USD238.2 million) made to 44 enterprises in 13
provinces. Huarong AMC Teams With Foreign Giants to Dispose of NPLs,
BUS . DAILY UPDATE , Dec. 10, 2002, available at LEXIS News [hereinafter
Teams with Foreign Giants].
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partners, 83 who paid nine cents on the dollar to Huarong,84 are
able to take controlling stakes.85 According to a profit sharing
plan, the income received by the partners from the follow-up
disposals will differ at various stages. If recovery goes extremely well, Huarong could recoup as high as 21% of the portfolio’s face value.86 Significantly, this deal tested the Chinese
government’s willingness to comply with the international
valuation practice, as there was a longtime concern within the
government that selling NPLs at a large discount to foreigners
amounted to stripping state assets.87 The official approval of
this transaction evidenced that “pragmatism on pricing the
debts ha[d] won the day.”88 As outside observers hoped, with
more international exposure, China’s NPL market would become better regulated and more transparent.89 In addition, incoming foreign participants would also bring to China their
proven techniques of distressed debt resolution, such as asset
secur itization discussed below.
III. OVERVIEW OF ASSET S ECURITIZATION
Subpart A reviews the background of asset securitization.
Subpart B then compares the benefits of securitization with its
costs.
A. Background of Securitization
Securitization is a financial innovation that transforms illiquid income-generating assets into securities with a second mar-

83. Four of the five blocks of NPLs were bought by a consortium including
Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Salomon Smith Barney and KTH Investments, Goldman Sachs bid for another block. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Restall, supra note 52. In line with international practice, two
disposal service firms will also be established to deal with the NPL disposal on
behalf of the two joint ventures. The business scope of the two ventures includes NPL management, transfer, exchange, sale and restructuring, as well
as debt collection, but no DESs, or direct investment services and other financial services, such as lending or deposits and settlement, are permitted.
Teams with Foreign Giants, supra note 82.
87. Kynge, supra note 81.
88. Restall, surpra note 52.
89. Foreign Capital Allowed, supra note 82.
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ket.90 In a typical securitization transaction, an originator company effects a “true sale” of its rights in receivables or other
financial assets to a special purpose vehicle, which then issues
securities backed by the transferred assets.91 Investors in the
capital markets then purchase these securities at prices based
on the ABSs’ credit rating.92 The SPV uses the ABS issuance
proceeds to pay for the financial assets.93 Sometimes mechanisms of credit enhancement such as letters of credit, third
party guarantees, or over-colleteralization are employed to provide investors with additional protections against the risk of
default payment.94 In many cases, the originator also acts as
servicer for the underlying assets, given its collecting expertise.95
Securitization first appeared in the 1970s, when the U.S. government took the initiative to develop a secondary market for
residential mortgage loans.96 Over the next three decades, the
scope of securitization greatly expanded to encompass a wide
range of assets, includ ing student loans, credit card loans,
automobile loans, airplane leases, commercial and recreational
equipment leases and loans, health care receivables, music royalty receivables, and non-performing loans.97 According to the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, securitization has

90. Joseph Shenker & Anthony Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution,
Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV . 1369, 1371–74 (1991).
91. A true sale is a complete divestiture of ownership — the transferor no
longer retains any right, title or interest in the property. It is intended to
have the effect of removing the assets transferred from the transferor’s estate
under section 541 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, an important feature of an SPV is its bankruptcy-remoteness. The Comm. on Bankr. and
Corp. Reorganization of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS . LAW . 527, 541 [hereinafter Structured
Financing Techniques]. To gain a general understanding of true sale and the
related issue of bankruptcy remoteness, see S CHWARCZ , S TRUCTURED FINANCE ,
supra note 7, Chs. 3 & 4.
92. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 7, at 136 (describing securitization as a
process whereby a company uses an SPV to “raise[] funds by issuing securities, — usually debt or debt-like securities — and [then uses] the receivables
purchased the originator to repay investors in the future”).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See GIDDY , supra note 12, at 2.
96. S CHWARCZ, S TRUCTURE D FINANCE , supra note 7, at 1-7 to 1-8.
97. Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 91, at 539.
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become “one of the dominant means of capital formation in the
United States.”98
B. Benefits and Costs of Securitization
Some commentators view securitization as a sort of “alchemy”
that benefits both the investors and originator.99 For investors,
secur itization provides an opportunity to invest in diversified
portfolio while undertaking a comparably low risk thanks to
credit enhancements.100 Furthermore, the transaction structure
can be flexibly designed to accommodate the needs of investors
with different or unique investment preferences.101
Reducing financing costs constitutes one of the primary benefits for an originator.102 In a securitization transaction, the interest rate paid to the ABS investors is less than that paid in a
straight debt issuance or equity offering by the originator.103
This is possible because the return that ABS investors demand
in a given deal is a function of only the credit rating of the securities backed by transferred assets.104 As a result, the originator’s creditworthiness is not a concern to the ABS investors.105
A high ABS credit rating can thus be achieved because of the
SPV’s isolated credit risk, as well as a careful structur al design
98. Investment Company Act Release No. 19,105, [1992 Transfer Binder]
FED. S EC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992).
99. S CHWARCZ, S TRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 1-2. Schwarcz argued that securitization is not a zero-sum game, in the sense that the originator’s benefits do not merely offset another person’s loss. He believed that securitization creates a genuine cost reduction for all parties. See id. at App. A:
Is Securitization A Zero-Sum Game? See also, Frederick Feldkamp, Asset
Securitization, The Alchemist’s Dream, in S ECURITIZATION YEARBOOK 2000 1
(supplement to INT ’L FIN. L. REV ., Oct. 2000); Shenker & Colletta, supra note
90; Howard Felson, Closing the Book on Jusen: An Account of the Bad Loan
Crisis and a Chapter for Securitization in Japan, 47 DUKE L. J. 567, 587
(1997).
100. See GIDDY , supra note 12, at 2–3.
101. Id. at 3–4.
102. Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 91, at 530–31.
103. S HWARCZ , STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 1–9.
104. Id. The most accepted rating agencies are Standard & Poor’s Rating
Group (“S&P”) and Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”). Another wellknown agency is Fitch, Inc. For a general discussion on rating in securitization, see section 8:9 of S CHWARCZ , STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7. See also
Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV 1 (2002) [hereinafter Rating Agency Paradox].
105. Id.
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and credit enhancements.106 Accordingly, an originator who is
unrated or rated below investment grade can nonetheless
through an SPV issue ABSs with an investment grade rating.107
Even for an originator that itself has an investment grade rating, cost savings may be achieved in securitization if the SPV
can issue ABSs with an even higher rating.
Another advantage is that the originator can attract broader
range of investors through a flexible transactional structure.108
A creative deal designer may effectively utilize overcollateralization, revolving asset pools, or subordinated interests to reconstructed ABS cash flows and maturity feature, in
order to cater to both risk averse and risk seeking inve stors.109
The resultant wider market reach may then transform into
higher demand for and better liquidity of the ABSs.110
Securitization transactions, however, incur substantial
transaction costs. There are, for example, costly fees payable to
the credit rating agencies, attorneys, investment bankers, and
accountants.111 Credit enhancement fees, annual reporting and
printing fees also add to the long list of expenses.112 Accordingly, some commentators argue that unless funds raised in a
transaction exceed USD50 million, the benefits can hardly justify the extremely high transaction costs.113
In general, an originator will need to weigh potential cost savings against the transaction costs before launching a securitization transaction.114 In other words, a company contemplating
securitization should compare the expected differential between
interest payable on alternative funding options and that on
ABSs issued by an applicable SPV, with the expected difference
in transaction costs between the alternative financing.115
106. Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 91, at 533–34.
107. Id.
108. Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 91, at 531.
109. Id.
110. The availability of funds in developed markets is usually not as limited
as in the private markets, and certain issues presented in the private markets, such as lending limits of a particular financing institution, do not exist
in the capital markets. Id.
111. See Felson, supra note 99, at 589.
112. Id. at 599.
113. Id. at 587.
114. S CHWARCZ, S TRUCT URED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 1–11.
115. Id.
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IV. SECURITIZATION OF DISTRESSED LOANS
Subpart A discusses the desirability of distressed loan securitization from both the originator and investors’ perspectives.
Subpart B then considers four factors important to the feasibility of distressed loan securitization. Subpart C studies the RTC
securitization program.
A. Desirability of Distressed Loan securitization
Generally, the business of securitizing distressed loans116 becomes more attractive when lending banks see a rise in corporate defaults within their portfolios, and therefore the banks
become concerned with their financial performances negatively
affected by the increasing number of problematic loans.117 From
the viewpoint of financial institutions, the usual suppliers of
secur ities backed by distressed loans, securitization limits their
exposure to further losses to the extent of any guarantee or
credit enhancement they provide to the transaction.118 At the
same time, the risks and rewards of the underlying problem
loans are transferred to and spread among market participants.119
From the investors’ perspective, securities backed by distressed loans can provide profitable investment opportunities as
long as the capital returns exceed the undertaken risks.120 In a
distressed loan securitization transaction, investors expect that
either the asset pool or the recoveries from loan collateral can
116. A loan is deemed distressed when the borrower’s financial ability to
honor its payment obligation comes into question. Common indicators of a
borrower’s financial difficulty include a breach of financial covenants, a payment or technical default of other debt obligations, or a trading value for their
debt significantly below other debts with similar coupon and maturity features. Not all distressed debts are in default. The distressed debt of an issuer
may be current on its bank loan obligations, but in technical or financial default on its other subordinated debt. However, in this situation, there is substantial near-term risk that the borrower will eventually default on its loan
obligations. See Henry Albulescu et al., Distressed Debts CDOs Spinning
Straw
into
Gold,
S&P
(May
7,
2001),
available
at
http://www.standardandpoors.com > “fixed income” > “credit ratings criteria”
[hereinafter [S&P Criteria].
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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provide sufficient value to compensate their investment.121 To
attract investors with different risk appetites, an originator
may structure the transaction in a way that the same asset pool
to generate several classes of notes with hierarchical seniority
and different credit ratings.122
In determining the proper interest rates payable to investors,
the ABS credit ratings assigned by credit rating agencies are
crucial. These agencies serve the public investors’ information
needs by inquiring and analyzing the key features of a securitization transaction.123 For example, Standard & Poor’s considers a number of factors in rating a distressed loan securitization
transaction originated by a financial institution: (1) quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the obligor’s credit worthiness; (2) recoveries; (3) quantification of liquidity needs; (4)
cash flow defaults and recoveries; (5) structural considerations;
(8) collateral manager capability; and (7) legal analysis. 124
B. Feasibility of Distressed Loan Securitization
At the heart of securitization is that asset pools must be able
to generate reasonably predictable cash flows to pay ABS inve stors interest and principal.125 Four factors are specifically important in determining the securitizability of distressed loans:
(1) the nature of the obligors; (2) the recovery rates of the distressed loans; (3) the quality of the originator-servicer; and (4)
the availability of liquidity facility and credit enhanc ement.
First, whether distressed loans are suitable for securitization
heavily depends on the nature of loan obligors.126 As commentators point out, the primary threats to steady ABS cash flows
are the risks of obligors’ slow payment or no payment.127 To offset these risks, the asset pool created should satisfy three requirements: (1) the loan portfolio must consist of a sufficiently
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Rating Agency Paradox, supra note 105, at 10.
124. S & P Criteria, supra note 116, at “Overview of Standard USD Poor’s
Methodology.”
125. S CHWARCZ, S TRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 2-1.
126. Id. at 1-1
127. The slow-payment risk is that the obligor on the loans may delay in
making their payments, thus creating liquidity problem for the SPV. The nopay risk is that the obligators may default in making their payments. Id. at 22.
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large number of obligors in order to allow a statistical determination of the default risk;128 (2) the loan concentration ratios
should be sufficiently low in order to avoid the possibility that
default by a relatively small number of obligors disproportionately harms the overall portfolio performance;129 (3) ideally, the
loans have homogeneous contractual terms, delinquency and
loss experience in order to minimize the costs incurred in obtaining and analyzing information on the portfolio. If these criteria are met, it is possible to employ an actuarial analysis on
expected losses, uniform underwriting standards and servicing
procedures that are satisfactory to rating agencies and inve stors.130 These three requirements explain why the paradigmatic
securitizable assets are mortgage loans, auto loans, or bank
credit card receivables. When a specific asset pool fails to meet
all of the requirements, success of the transaction will require
using credit enhanc ements to mitigate the risks.131
Second, recovery records serve as a crucial performance variable in distressed loan securitization.132 By definition, distressed loans already have high delinquency and default risks.
In securitization of such assets, therefore, the recovery ratio
becomes a more meaningful consideration than default risk.133
Recoveries may come from refinancing, restructuring or liquidation.134 As long as recoveries produce a cash flow with relative
predictability, the securities backed by distressed loans can also
receive high credit rating, which may be further improved
through credit enhancement. Factors relevant to such recoveries include the characteristics of coupons, collateral type, and
origination date. 135 For example, if the loan is collateralize d by
assets with high liquidity value, such as tradable securities or
real property at a good location, then the recovery ratio is likely
to be high.

128. Id.
129. This term refers to a situation where a relatively small number of the
obligors account for a disproportionately large amount of loan portfolios. Id.
at 2-2 to 2-3.
130. Shenker & Colletta, supra note 90, at 1377.
131. S CHWARCZ, S TRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 2-2.
132. S & P Criteria, supra note 116, at “Recoveries.”
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Third, the originator-servicer (usually a financial institution)
plays a key role in a distressed loan securitization.136 After all,
the originator is the entity responsible for creating the asset
pool from a suitable portfolio.137 In addition, investors also rely
heavily on the originator to channel the cash flow generated
from the asset pool to the SPV for interest distribution.138 Furthermore, the originator often assumes the servicer’s role given
its experience and skills in collecting debts and enforcing creditor’s rights. In the event of loan defaults, the originator should
take the best course of action to maximize recoveries for the
investors’ benefit.139 In servicing securities backed by distressed loans, the originator’s main task is not one of selecting
and monitoring loans that are expected to be performing.140
Rather, the focus is on choosing weak loans with good recovery
prospects and on actively working with the defaulted borrowers,
the lending group, bankruptcy courts, and any other parties in
order to generate the necessary cash flow to service the required ABS payments.141 To increase its ability to better service
the asset pool(s), the originator may also transfers a part of servicing function to a reliable outside specialist.142
Finally, liquidity facility and credit enhancement mechanisms are often necessary to meet cash shortfalls and to raise
ABS credit rating to a desirable level. One great liquidity need
stems from significant loan defaults and/or restructurings.143
Defaults usually result in an immediate cessation of the borrowers’ promised loan payments.144 In addition, restructuring
and bankruptcy by one obligor may cause a write-down or extension of an original loan contract in order to alleviate the
debtor’s financial burden.145 When any of these events happen,
it becomes less certain when obligors’ repayments under loan

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Felson, supra note 99, at 603.
S &P Criteria, supra note 116.
Felson, supra note 99, at 603.
S &P Criteria, supra note 116.
Id.
Id.
Felson, supra note 99, at 604.
S&P Criteria, supra note 116.
Id.
Id.
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contracts can be collected to service the ABSs.146 Other than the
liquidity problems caused by obligors, there are also cash needs
to pay periodic transactional fees,147 such as fees for servicer,
trustee, accountants, legal experts and financial advisors.148
Given the magnitude of liquidity problems in distressed loan
securitization, therefore, it is necessary to create significant
reserve accounts filling cash shortfalls. 149
Credit enhancement mechanisms are also necessary to mitigate the problem of low repayment predictability and to raise
the credit ratings of securities backed by distressed loans.150
External credit enhancement can take different forms, such as
a guaranty or surety bond, a bank letter of credit, an irrevocable credit line, or cash collateral account.151 There are two common types of internal credit enhancement used in distressed
loan securitization. One is over-collateralization, which means
the anticipated cash flow from the underlying assets exceeds
the scheduled principal and interest payments.152 This arrangement helps to assure that a sufficient cash cushion exists
to meet repayment obligations. The second one is seniorsubordinate structure,153 in which sophisticated investors willing to take a high level of risk would purchase subordinated
secur ities, effectively providing another assurance for the SPV’s
senior securities bought by average investors.154
C. The RTC Securitization Program
The first securitization of non-performing loans in the U.S.
history was the “N” series program by the Resolution Trust
146. Id. Additional liquidity problems can arise with revolving loans. When
distressed revolving bank loans are sold to the SPV, both the right to receiving borrower payments and the obligation to fund borrower draws are transferred to securitization. However, the terms of most revolving facilities loan
allow the lenders to suspend borrower draws if there is any significant deterioration or material change in the borrower’s financial condition. Therefore,
the corresponding liquidity needs may be less of a concern. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. S CHWARCZ, S TRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 2-16 to 2-17.
152. GIDDY , supra note 12, at 11.
153. S CHWARCZ, S TRUCTURED FINANCE , supra note 7, at 2-17 to 2-18.
154. The interest rate on these subordinated securities would be higher
than that on the senior securities to compensate for the greater risk. Id.
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Corporation (“RTC”) in the early to mid 1990s.155 Congress created RTC as a major effort to manage and resolve the assets of
failed savings and loan associations.156 In its six years of existence, the RTC resolved 747 insolvent thrifts and recovered
USD395 billion of the USD456 billion in its charge.157 Heralded
by observers as an outstanding success, the RTC employed
many innovative strategies to promptly dispose of portfolios
under its mandate.158 The options RTC used varied depending
on the quality and nature of the assets involved. High liquid
assets, such as government securities, single-family mortgage backed bonds, and high-yield bonds were disposed of without
much difficulty in the well-developed secondary markets.159 For
lower quality assets such as non-performing mortgages, the
RTC employed three major techniques: bulk sales, auctions, and
mortgage securitization.160
The RTC’s securitization model for mortgage-backed securities presented several features. First, the RTC issued securities
in registered offerings.161 The disclosure requirements of regis-

155. See Jack Rodman, Asia’s Budding Revival, 60 M ORTGAGE BANKING
3640 (2000).
156. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 501, 103 Stat. 183, 184 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
157. See Dean Foust, The RTC’s Epitaph: It Worked, B US . WK ., Jan. 15,
1996, at 29; Alvin K. Lim, The S&L Crisis Revisited: Exporting An American
Model to Resolve Thailand’s Banking Problems, 9 D UKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
343, 355–56 (1998).
158. See Foust, supra note 157. The RTC achieved impressive performances, evidencing by the fact that the taxpayers’ burden for the clean-up was
only under USD145 billion, much less than many experts had predicted, the
agency also received various critics. See Lim, supra note 157, at 355–56.
However, it was charged with mismanagement, including the excessive use of
expensive consultants as well as outright fraudulent billing by contractors, as
well as hastily unloading its assets at bargain prices to the benefit of wealthy
investors and detriment of taxpayers. See id. Nevertheless, “the general consensus is that the RTC was a rare example of a government agency that operated efficiently and effectively.” Id.
159. See Lim, supra note 157, at 357.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 359. The RTC initially filed a USD4 billion shelf registration
with the SEC in May 1991 to securitize single and multi-family mortgage
loans. It subsequently filed more registrations to accommodate additional
transactions in single and multi family loans, as well as commercial mortgage
loans. See also Kenneth J. Bacon, Director of RTC Office of Securitization,
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tration allowed investors to access material information regarding the underlying mortgages’ risks, thus increasing public interest in the issuance and resulting liquidity of the securities.162
In addition, the assets underlying the securities were typically
held in trusts, which further reassured investors that the asset
pools would be under unitary management.163 Furthermore,
credit enhancements, such as reserve funds, were used to obtain sufficiently high investment ratings in order to entice institutional investors.164 Finally, to handle non-residential commercial mortgages in the pool that became non-performing, a
“special servicer” was established to review the cases and take
all necessary measures to minimize losses. 165
Under the N-series program created specifically for securitization of sub- and non-performing mortgage loans, the RTC required interested commercial mortgage bankers to align with
equity investors to purchase about half of any loan portfolio,
while the RTC retained the remaining portion as a passive
partner.166 The first deal of N series, N-1, closed in December
1992. 167 This deal acquired USD350 million in book value of
non- and sub-performing loans from the RTC.168 The RTC, as a
partner in the fund, leveraged the portfolio with USD110 million of debt raised by Lehman Brothers, and then sold a 50%
equity interest in the remaining cash flows to Bankers Trust
and Soros Realty for an undisclosed sum.169 The RTC’s NPL
secur itizaiton program was successful partially because the
agency worked closely with the private sector in market development.170 Usually, private institutional investors participated
Securitization at the RTC, N AT’ L M ORTGAGE NEWS, Apr. 12, 1993, at 4, available at LEXIS News.
162. See Lim, supra note 157, at 359.
163. Id.
164. Id. Reserve fund levels were approximately four to seven times the
expected losses on the total amount of assets the RTC securitized. The reserve funds were held by a trust and funded from bond proceeds. Bacon, supra note 161.
165. See Lim, supra note 157, at 360.
166. Commercial MBs Can Service RTC CRE, NAT ’L M ORTGAGE NEWS,
March 1, 1993, at 13, available at LEXIS News.
167. Marlene Givant Star, RTC Courts Pension Fund Assets, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS , March 22, 1993, at 35, available at LEXIS News.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Bacon, supra note 161.
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in the transactions in teams composed of asset managers, distressed loan servicers, and underwriters. These teams could
then capitalize on their expertise in NPLs and structured finance, and make use of their access to capital markets.
V. SECURITIZATION DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA
This Part examine s the securitization experience of Japan,
Korea and Taiwan, with an emphasis on their legal and regulatory development facilitating local market securitization.
As a sophisticated financial innovation, securitization has
witnessed phenomenal successes in the U.S. and United Kingdom. This phenomenon perhaps surprises no one as these two
countries enjoy the benefits that come along with a flexible
common law system and highly developed financial markets.
While many other countries also seek to develop similar programs in their own markets,171 they come to realize the necessity and importance of establishing not only supportive capital
markets but also adequate legal and regulatory infrastructures.172
To many Asian countries, their civil code systems present obstacles for carrying out securitization comprehensively. One
commentator remarks on this difficulty:
[T]raditional asset securitization structures cannot simply be
“parachuted” into individual financial systems (especially
those of emerging market economies with a civil law tradition)
and expected to fulfill the sorts of functions for which they are
so useful in the United States and the United Kingdom.173
171. For example, France and Spain have successfully completed securitization transactions, Germany and Italy have passed legislation to promote securitization. See generally, ASSET-BACKED S ECURITIZATION IN EUROPE (Theodor
Baums & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1996).
172. See Douglas Arner, Emerging Market Economies And Government
Promotion of Securitization, 12 DUKE J. COMP . & INT ’L L. 505, 506 (2002) (outlining for an emerging economy the requisite capital market and legal factors
necessary for mortgage securitization).
173. Arner listed the following purposes that securitization may serve in the
developed financial markets of the U.S. and U.K.: (1) supporting public policy
objectives such as broad home ownership and the development of financial
markets (especially capital and mortgage markets); (2) addressing regulatory
requirements for financial institutions, especially capital adequacy and lending limit requirements applicable to banks; (3) transferring risk, especially in
the context of non-performing assets and portfolio diversification; and (4) providing finance. See id. at 505. In addition, Feldkamp argued that properly
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Nonetheless, undertaking an asset securitization transaction
in any given jurisdiction serves as a useful “stress test” of the
limits in that specific jurisdiction, especially in respect to legal
impediments. 174

Although the inflexibility of civil legal systems makes it difficult to accommodate various securitization structures,175 East
Asia’s great need for new capitals, especially after the financial
crisis of late 1990s, has spurred exportation of this financial
technology into the region.176 With governmental support, several Asian economies have actively modified their individual
legal and regulatory frameworks by implementing new legislation.177
Japan is the first Asian country that experimented with securitization. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several Japanese
government charged committees and organizations started to
explore this financial tool. 178 In 1993, the Japanese Diet (the
parliament) enacted the Law Regarding Regulation of the Business Concerning Specified Claims (“Specified Claims Law”),
which permitted limited securitization of leases and credit card
claims.179 This legislation provided the impetus for the first securitizations backed by assets, such as auto loans and industrial and computer lease receivables.180 In 1995, the Ministry of
Finance proposed a liberalization of the financial markets to
permit financial institutions and certain credit corporations to
issue ABSs through domestic special purpose corporations.181
The Japanese “Big Bang” initiated in 1996 set prompt resolu-

implemented securitization could prevent or cure “liquidity traps,” the “ultimate bad consequence of flawed economic and financial management policies”
in the U.S. See Feldkamp, supra note 99, at 1.
174. Arner, supra note 173, at 506.
175. Kevin T.S. Kong, Prospects For Asset Securitization Within China’s
Legal Framework: the Two-Tiered Model, 32 CORNELL INT ’L L.J. 237, 244
(1998).
176. Id.
177. For example, Indonesia enacted the Mortgage on Land and LandRelated Objects Law to facilitate secured lending based on land assets. Thailand introduced implementing legislation to create insolvency and trustee
laws similar to the U.S. legal structure. Id.
178. Felson, supra note 99, at 591.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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tion of the NPLs as a top priority for banking liberalization.182
In a landmark transaction of 1999, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter sold the first securities backed by Japanese NPLs on a mix
consisting of office, retail and apartment buildings.183
The Japanese legal and regulatory framework relevant to securitization went through considerable changes in the 1990s.184
The developments in four legal areas are most significant.
First, the burdensome perfection procedure imposed by the
Japanese Civil Code185 was streamlined through the passage of
so called MITI Securitization Law of 1993186 and more significantly the 1998 Perfection law.187 Under the new perfection
system, assignments of large numbers of financial assets can be
perfected easily through a one -time filing.188 Second, the Law
182. Id.
183. Rodman, supra note 155.
184. For a discussion on the legal obstacles to securitization that Japan
faced before the major framework modification was completed, see Hideki
Kanda, Securitization in Japan, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT ’L L. 359 (1998) (identifying three major obstacles: first, the compliance with the perfection requirements in connection with an asset transfer was costly and cumbersome; second, Japanese corporate law made it expensive to set up a special purpose
entity; third, the regulatory structure of securities was complex and inflexible
due to the long history of jurisdictional struggles among ministries involved).
185. Under the article 467 of Japanese Civil Code, to perfect the assignment
of a contractual right, including receivables with respect to interested third
parties, the assignor must either deliver proper notice or obtain necessary
consent. In either case, the assignor is required to ensure that the relevant
documents bear officially certified dates. See Masaru Ono, Unique Aspects of
Japanese Securitization Relating To The Assignment of Financial Assets, 12
DUKE J. COMP . & INT’L L. 469, 472 (2002). See also, Yoshiki Shimada & Shinji
Itoh, Japanese Asset Securitization: A Guide For Practitioners, 38 HARV . INT ’L
L. J. 171, 179–180 (1997).
186. TOKUTEI SAIKENTO NI KAKARU JIGYO NO KISEI NI KANSURU HORITSU [Law
concerning the restrictions of business relating to specified claims, etc.], Law
No. 77 of 1992. This law is commonly named after its main sponsor, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (“MITI”). This law covers only specific types of financial assets, mainly auto loans and lease receivables. It is
less often used since the passage of the Perfection Law.
187. S AIKEN JOTO NO TAIKO YOKEN NI KANSURU MINPO NO TOKUREITO NI
KANSURU HORITSU [Law prescribing exceptions, etc., to the civil cod requirements for setting up against a third party to an assignment of claims], Law
No. 104 of 1998. This law has a broader coverage. It allows general companies to perfect the assignment of monetary claims in relation to third parties
through filing a simple electronic registration with the Legal Affairs Office of
the Japanese government. See Ono, supra note 184, at 472.
188. Id.
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Concerning the Securitization of Specified Assets by Special
Purpose Companies (“SPC law”) was passed and subsequently
amended to reduce the cost of the establishment and operation
of special purpose vehicles.189 Third, in 1998, Japan amended
the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law to facilitate
cross-border transactions. The amended law eliminated licensing and prior notification requirements previously imposed on
any transfer of receivables between Japanese residents and foreigners.190 Finally, Japan enacted a new “servicer” statute to
allow corporations to engage in the business of servicing NPLs
originated by financial institutions.191 This enactment has invited major foreign players to establish special -purpose corporations to service NPLs, providing comfort among the international investors interested in acquiring such assets in Japan.192
Securitization also made substantial inroads in other East
Asian countries in the late 1990s when the region was struggling with the aftermath of a major economic and financial
breakdown. In Korea, before the Act on Asset-backed Securitization (“Korean ABS Act”) was enacted in 1998, securitization
was difficult, if not impossible.193 The Korean ABS Act became
the cornerstone of the rapidly developing securitization in Korea.194 A major purpose of this act was to improve the soundness of financial institutions.195 This act greatly facilitated Ko-

189. The SPC law became effective on September 1, 1998 and was amended
in 2000. Among other things, the amendment reduced the SPC’s minimum
capital, registration and license tax and the real property acquisition tax. The
new law also broadened the scope of specific assets that may be securitized by
an SPC to include general proprietary rights, in addition to loans extended by
financial institutions, nominative monetary credits, real estate and beneficial
interest of the trust holding such assets. See Japan: Amendment to Promote
Securitization, 19 INT’L FIN . L. REV . 48 (2000).
190. Id.
191. See Yoshiki Shimad & Togo Dowaki, Japan, in 17 INT’L FI N. L. REV . 40
(1998).
192. Rodman, supra note 155.
193. Sean Bulmer & Hyoung Don Kim, Korea, in S ECURITIZATION YEARBOOK
2000 28 (supplement to INT’ L. FIN. L. REV ., Oct. 2000).
194. Id.
195. The Act on Asset Backed Securitization, art.1 [hereinafter Korean ABS
Act].
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rea’s NPL resolution and contributed to the suc cessful restructuring of the country’s financial system.196
The Korean ABS Act provides for the establishment of a
bankruptcy-remote special purpose company (“SPC”)197 and the
appointment of a qualified service provider to manage the assets.198 It also sets forth certain conditions, which if satisfied
assure a transfer of assets to be a true sale rather than a secured financing.199 The Act further requires registration of a
securitization plan, which contains certain information regarding the transferred assets, originator and securities issued.200
The registration of assets transfer can be accomplished through
a filing with the Financial Supervisory Committee.201 In addition, securitization enjoys certain tax benefits, including a 50
percent reduction in capital gains taxes for the sale of real
properties by the SPC, and an exemption of registration and
acquisition taxes on real properties acquired by the SPC within
a certain period of time.202
The Korea Asset Management Corporation (“Kamco”), a government NPL resolution agency,203 has achieved impressive per196. South Korea emerged as the star performer among the Asian economies in financial reform. It leads the way of restoring banking industry to
health. Asian Banking 2000 Review, supra note 26, at 45.
197. Korean ABS Act, ch. 3.
198. Id. art. 11.
199. Id. art. 13. It is rather special that this act details the specifics of true
sale instead of leaving it to the discretion of the courts. See Jong-Goo Yi,
Trends and Issues in Securitization in Korea, INT’ L FIN. L. REV . 2425 (Apr. 1
2001), available at 2001 WL 15390492.
200. Korean ABS Act, arts. 3–4.
201. On completion of the transfer registration, the transfer of receivables
will be deemed to have been perfected against third parties, which obviates
the need to complete the normal perfection steps such as sending of notices
with a fixed date stamp. If receivables are secured by mortgages, on registration of transfer of receivables with the FSC, the mortgages are deemed to have
been transferred to the SPC. Therefore, the normal steps to register the transfer of mortgages with the relevant real property registration office are not
necessary. Id, arts. 6–8.
202. See Yi, supra note 199.
203. Kamco is the only institution in Korea charged with this mandate. This
mission is stated under the government Act on the Efficient Disposal of Bad
Assets of Financial Institutions. Currently, 38% of Kamco’s shares are directly owned by the Korean government, another 31% indirectly owned by the
government through the Korea Development Bank, and the rest is owned by
24 Korean financial institutions. Of the NPLs acquired by Kamco, 63.19%
were from commercial banks, 24.81% from investment trust companies, 7.97%
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formance in utilizing securitization to resolve NPLs. From 1999
to 2001, Kamco successfully securitized USD5.9 billion of NPLs
acquired from financial institutions.204 Kamco made its first
domestic public offering of NPL backed securities worth
USD271 in June 1999.205 Samsung Securities and Huyndai Securities bought the bonds and auctioned them off to local inve stors.206 Kamco’s first international NPL securitzation was
accomplished in July 2000.207
A dual SPV structure
accomplished this transaction.208 A Korean SPV sold a senior
note backed by a NPL portfolio denominated in U.S. dollars and
Japanese yen to a Cayman SPV.209 Two credit enhancements
were used for the Korean senior note: subordinated notes and
irrevocable credit facility that the Korean Development Bank
provided.210 The Cayman SPV then issued USD367,000,000
floating rate notes due in 2009, secured by the issuer’s interest
in the Korean SPV senior note.211 The Cayman SPV senior
notes were rated at BBB and Baa2 by Fitch and Moody’s
respectively, and listed on the Luxemburg Stock Exchange.212
The notes were then offered to qualified institutional buyers in
the U.S. pursuant to Rule 144(a).213
Taiwan passed its Financial Assets Securitization Statute in
2002. 214 Modeled on the Japanese civil law approach, this legislation provides for Special Purpose Trusts (“SPTs”) to securitize
assets and issue beneficiary certificates backed by those asfrom insurance companies and 3.61% from merchant banks. See FQA, at
http://www.kamco.or.kr/eng/faq/faq1.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
204. New Tack Eyed for Collection Agency, NIKKEI WEEKLY (July 9, 2001),
available at LEXIS News.
205. Kamco “MIRAE” Bond 99-1, at http://www.kamco.or.kr/eng/area/mirae/
mirea99-1.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Kamco “MIRAE” Bond
99-1].
206. Id.
207. Sean Bulmer & Hyoung Don Kim, Kamco NPL Securitization, in
S ECURITIZATION YEARBOOK 2000 28, 29 (supplement to INT ’L FI N. L. REV .
(2000)) [hereinafter Kamco NPL Securitization].
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Karen Richardson, Taiwan’s Tough Stance on Banks Lures Investors,
WALL S T. J., Dec. 18, 2002, at C14.

File: CAO Base Macro Final.doc

2003]

Created on: 3/24/2003 7:12 PM

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:27 AM

ASSET SECURITIZATION FOR CHINA

595

sets.215 It also sets out the types of financial assets that may be
securitized.216 The act permits financial institutions to pool
home mortgages, credit-card receivables, or corporate loans —
including non-performing loans — and then issue new debts
backed by these assets.217 In addition, borrowing the U.S. concept of “Ginnie Mae,” the act allows Taiwanese government and
financial institutions to establish a fund to promote securitization and guarantee creditworthiness.218 Significantly, financial
analysts view this legislation as a major component of Taiwan’s
comprehensive program to clean up its NPL laden banking industry.219 Experience in several other Asian countries, including Thailand and the Philippines,220 also demonstrated that
during the time of financial turmoil, there tended to be a great
demand for the restructuring of financial institutions with a
large volume of non-performing assets. 221 Notably, the need to
resolve NPLs, a prevalent problem in the region, served as a
catalyst for securitization in East Asia.
VI. NPL SECURITIZATION IN CHINA: THE MARKET CONDITIONS
When acceded to the WTO in December 2001, China undertook to open its entire financial sector to foreign competition
after five years. As time quickly goes by, the Chinese government sees the increasing exigency of overhauling its insolvent
banking system. Promptly disposing of the daunting NPLs,
therefore, tops China’s financial restructuring agenda. Because
of the U.S. and other Asian countries’ successful experience,
securitization began to attract attention in China as an alternative NPL resolution. The PBoC, a major Chinese financial regu215. Qi Lin International Law Offices, Securitization Law Nears Passage
(Sept. 2001), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/qilin_cm_0901.pdf.
216. Taiwan’ NPL ratio is estimated to range from 6.5 to 15% of all loans.
Neil Campbell et al., Securitisation Comes to Taiwan (Oct. 2001)¸ available at
http:// www.securitization.net/pdf/qilin_sectai_1001.pdf.
217. Richardson, supra note 214.
218. Qi Lin, supra note 215.
219. Id. See also Campbell, supra note 216.
220. Richardson, supra note 214.
221. See Yi, supra note 199. In fact, Japan has recently realized that it has
been slow in securitizing the distressed loans taken over by the Resolution
and Collection Corporation, and that it should learn from the successful experience of the Korea Asset Management Corporation. New Tack Eyed for
Collection Agency, NIKKEI WEEKLY, July 9, 2001, available at LEXIS News.
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lator, has indicated its support for such an experiment.222 Financial institutions, especially the AMCs mandated with NPL
disposition, have been actively e xploring this new option.223
A. Supply of NPL Securitization
The supply of NPL securitization in China can be understood
from the four feasibility factors identified in Part IV.224 The
first factor affecting asset pool creation is the nature of obligors.
Ideally, the underlying portfolio should feature with a statistically large number of obligors, low loan concentration ratios,
and standardized or similar loan contractual terms.225 In reality, however, the Chinese state banks have extended four fifths
of their lending to SOEs, particularly favoring a targeted group
consisting of the biggest ones, which the government deemed as
pillars of the state sector.226 Furthermore, because bank lending oftentimes provided the main source of working capitals for
SOEs, loan agreements varied in their terms, depending upon
the borrowers’ business and financial conditions.227 Unfortunately, a large number of SOEs do not generate enough operating revenues even before interest expenses were paid.228 Many
of them have no viable prospect of becoming profitable. They
have not been liquidated due to the governmental concern that
222. During the “China Development Summit Forum” held on March 25,
2001 in Beijing, Dai Xianglong, governor the Chinese Central Bank PBoC,
stated that China would study the successful experiences of international
asset management companies and experiment assets securitization as a way
to dispose of NPLs. Dai also emphasized the possibility of using securitization
as a means to introduce international capital and expertise into Chinese
banking sector. See Zhengquanhua: Huajie Buliang Zichan de Youxiao Tujing (Securitization: An Effective Approach of Resolving NPLs), JINRONG
LILUN Y U S HIJIAN (FI N. THEORIES AND PRAC.) (Beijing, 2001).
223. Our analysis of the NPL securitization market below focuses on the
portfolios transferred from the state banks to the AMCs for the reason that
the AMCs are specifically set up by the government to deal with NPL resolution. Major references are made to the practices of Huarong, one of the biggest and most adventuring AMCs in China.
224. See infra Part IV.
225. See infra footnotes 126–154 and accompanying text.
226. Casino Capital, supra note 1, at 11.
227. See Dan Huang, Woguo Tuixing Zichan Zhengquanhua de Zhang’ai
Fenxi (An analysis on the Obstacles to Asset Securitization in China) at 1 (on
file with the author).
228. See Pitfalls Ahead, supra note 74.
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an aggressive reform plan would produce vast social implications and even unrest.229
The foregoing analysis of the first factor establishes that a
vast majority of NPLs under the Chinese AMCs management is
not suitable for securitization. However, it is not true that
NPLs securitization is completely impossible. An inquiry under
the second factor, i.e. the recovery ratios, shows that among the
massive portfolios of Chinese NPLs, three groups of NPLs seem
to be potentially securitizable.
The first group is the non-performing commercial mortgages
extended in the mid 1990s during economic overheating.230 This
type of NPL, although accounting for only a small percentage of
the overall Chinese NPLs, is still sizable in absolute dollar
amounts.231 Recovering certain portion of such NPLs’ value is
viable given the rapid economic growth seen in the major Chinese cities, the locations of many the real estate projects involved in NPLs.232
In addition, non-performing corporate loans secured by land
use rights or other real estate collateral are also potential securitization assets. However, cash flow generated through foreclosure and liquidation of NPL collateral must be reasonably
predictable to support the ABS repayments.233 This would rest
on the enforceability of the AMCs’ creditor rights and a functioning liquidation market. 234 However, China’s current cond itions with respect to both factors are yet to be further improved.
The last group of securitizable NPLs originates from loans
rendered to SOEs with whom the AMCs are able to work out
229. See Corporate/Debt Restructuring: Japan, The Hong Kong SAR & The
People’s Republic of China: A Roundtable Discussion, 10 AM . BANKR. INST. L.
REV . 1, 23 (2002) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion]. See generally, L ARDY,
supra note 22, ch. 2 (The State-Owned Enterprise Problem).
230. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
231. Interview with Xiaobo Wang, General Manager of Huarong Research
Department, in Beijing, China, (Jan. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Interview with
Wang]. No published statistics on this category of NPLs are currently available.
232. Cf. Felson, supra note 99, at 609 (arguing that jusen (Japanese consumer mortgage loans) securitization could provide investors with a profitable
opportunity when the real estate appreciates as a result of development programs and an overall growth in the Japanese economy).
233. See Xiaobo Wang, Buliang Zichan Ye Keyi Zhengquanhua (NonPerforming Loans Can Also be Securitized) (on file with the author).
234. Interview with Wang, supra note 231.
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reliable repayment schedules. In fact, Kamco, the Korean counterpart of the Chinese AMCs, has successfully securitized certain distressed corporate loans transferred from financial institutions.235 Significantly, Kamco securitized only “restructured
corporate loans,” i.e. loans that have obtained court approvals of
restructuring as part of corporate re-organization or composition proceeding regardless of security existence.236 The borrowers were private companies considered operationally viable with
only temporary liquidity problems.237 The asset pools, therefore, could generate predictable repayments based on court
sanctioned restructuring schedules.238 Among the Chinese
AMCs’ debtor SOEs, there exist a certain number of comp anies
that have viable business prospect but incurred excessive debts.
These companies are potentially able to pay off a portion, but
not the whole, of their bank loans.239 Effective debt restructuring with these SOE debtors, therefore, would recover a fraction
of the NPL book value.240 In fact, the Chinese government has
provided the AMCs with an authority to partially forgive certain SOEs’ debts and then work out the balance in new payment schedules.241 For example, among Huarong’s NPL recoveries, over 80% were accomplished through debt restructuring,
with less than 20% stemming from liquidation.242 To support
securitization, however, the repayment stream under debt restructuring must be reasonably predictable. Absent the court
235. See Kamco “MIRAE” Bond 99-1, supra note 205.
236. Therefore, when Kamco initially purchased these loans, the original
lenders were not entitled to declare default or execute their claims through
the foreclosure. This was due to the current and existing repayments of the
loans according to the rescheduled payment schedules. Thus, in valuing the
restructured loans, more emphasis has been given to the credit standing of the
borrowers. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. In addition, when purchasing the NPLs from the Korean commercial banks Kamco retains a put option, which allows Kacmo to sell back the
NPLs to the relevant banks on the occurrence of certain events such as payment default continuing for six months. Id.
239. Kaisheng Yang, Restructuring and Disposing of China’s Financial NonPerforming Assets — A New Investment Trend in China, Address at Asia
Society’s Conference “Investing in China’s Financial Market” (May, 2002) (on
file with the author) [hereinafter Yang Speech].
240. Id.
241. The banks are however not permitted to reach such partial debt forgiveness agreements with their SOE debtors. Id.
242. Id.
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sanction and monitoring that were available to Kamco, the Chinese AMCs will have to rely on the not very effective nonjudicial methods to enforce their restructured payment plans.
The foregoing discussion indicates that the Chinese AMCs
may create asset pools consisting of certain securitizable
NPLs.243 In order to understand the technical aspects of secur itization one must also consider the third and fourth feasibility
elements.
The quality of servicer cannot be overestimated. To make a
NPL securitization plan work, the originator-servicer, which in
this note’s analysis would be one of the Chinese AMCs, must
recover predictable cash flows either by actively working with
the obligors, or by liquidating foreclosed loan collateral. The
AMCs can be expected to well perform the originator-servicer
functions given their full resolution power and expertise in debt
collection and workout. In addition, the AMCs can further enhance their capability through strategic alliance with experienced international counterparts.244
The success of NPL securitization also requires the availability of liquidity arrangements and credit enhancements. Given
the low predictability of NPL repayment cash flows and substantial liquidity risks, significant reserve accounts are usually
indispensable to fill the cash shortfalls.245 Furthermore, credit
enhancements are also necessary in order to provide structural
protection. In the case of Chinese NPL securitization, to raise
the ABS credit rating to above investment grade, it is desirable

243. Huarong seems to have completed its design of a pilot asset backed
securitization scheme and the establishment of asset pools. It has submitted
this plan to relevant financial regulators.
CHINA HUARONG ASSET
M ANAGEMENT CORPORATION, OVERVIEW 2001, at 15 (on file with author). In
fact, Huarong’s first international NPL auction provides a good example of
portfolio selection for the purpose of structuring a particular transaction.
About 60% of the assets underlying the sold NPLs are in SOEs, with the remainder to commercial property, industrial parks, hotels, residential precincts, and a free trade zone. See Kynge, supra note 87.
244. For example, on April 26, 2001, Huarong entered with Kamco a memorandum inviting the latter to work as its advisor in securitization, and to assist Huarong select portfolios and design securities structure. Huarong Invites Foreign Advisor for Asset-Based Securitization, XIN HUA, April 26, 2001,
available at LEXIS News.
245. Wang, supra note 233, at 3.
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for the AMCs to provide guarantees and to use senior/subordinated structures.246
B. Demands for NPL Securitization
The demand for NPLs securitization cannot be analyzed
without first understanding the general conditions of China’s
capital markets. Although the markets have achieved remar kable growth, they still have a long way to go before reaching a
more mature stage. The following discussion highlights a few
prominent market features.
First, expansions in primary equity market and that of primary debt market are not balanced, with the former far outstripping the latter. China’s debt market mainly consists of
treasury bonds.247 In 1987, the Ministry of Finance issued the
nation’s first treasury bonds, and by 1998 total Treasury issues
rose to about USD80 billion.248 This increase resulted from the
Chinese government’s growing reliance on treasury issues to
finance its fiscal deficits.249 In contrast, the equity market has
experienced a much more dramatic growth. China did not have
a stock market until 1990, but now more than 1,200 stocks are
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, with a
market capitalization of around USD500 billion, second in Asia
only to Japan.250 In addition, Chinese companies make up 35%
of Hong Kong’s stock market capitalization, against only 7% in
1995. 251
In addition, the secondary market activities are significantly
speculative. Price/earning ratios in China’s stock market are
not supported by fundamentals.252 Individual investors, rather
than institutional investors, dominate the nation’s stock mar-

246. Id.
247. Bob Yau-Ching Chan, The Mortgage-Backed Securities Market in the
People’s Republic of China, in M ORTGAGE -BACKED S ECURITIES M ARKET IN ASIA
68–74 (1999), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Mortgage_
Backed_Securities_Markets.
248. ERNST & YOUNG REPORT, supra note 25, at 35.
249. See Chan, supra note 247, at 247
250. Casino Capital, supra note 1, at 10.
251. Id.
252. Chan, supra note 247, at 68.
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ket.253 These investors trade frequently on rumors, causing
high market volatility.254 In the secondary bond market institutional investors are the main players. They trade in large volumes but usually concentrate on a particular issue, and therefore making prices quite volatile.255
Furthermore, the access to capital markets is highly regulated. Under the current Company Law companies eligible for
entering domestic bond market are only those which have ge nerate profits in the past three consecutive years and where the
average profits generated by such companies during such threeyear period are enough to repay the companies’ one year interest on the bonds to be issued. 256 In fact, the PBoC approved few
corporate bonds were approved in recent years.257 Similarly,
new share listings on the stock market are subject to tight restrictions by the China Secur ities Regulatory Commission. The
CSRC has been functioning as the “country’s chief allocator of
equity market,” giving favor almost exclusively to SOEs.258
Finally, China’s capital markets are still largely closed to foreign investors. Until very recently, the only onshore market
available to foreigners was the foreign currency denominated Bshare market, which is very small in capitalization (about 3% of
that of the RMB denominated A-share market), and thinly
traded.259 With China’s WTO admission, rules restricting foreign investment in domestic markets are being gradually eased.
A major progress in market open-up was achieved in the end of
year 2002, whe n the CSRC and PBoC jointly promulgated a
new regulation allowing “qualified foreign institutional inve s-

253. There are about 66 million individual investors in the Chinese stock
market, with 100-odd brokers, and 15 fund-management companies serving
them. Casino Capital, supra note 1, at 10.
254. Chan, supra note 247, at 68.
255. Id.
256. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GONGSI FA (Company Law of the People’s Republic of China) art. 159, translated in LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMM' N
OF THE S TANDING C OMM . OF THE N AT ’L PEOPLE ’S C ONGRESS, T HE L AWS OF THE
PEOPLE ’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1993, at 269–318 (1995).
257. Chan, supra note 247, at 69.
258. Casino Capital, supra note 1, at 11. S&P counts thiry-five “private”
listed companies in China, but points out that local governments and even the
military are in fact in control of a good number of them. Id.
259. See Ma, supra note 63.
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tors” (“QFIIs”) to invest in domestic equity and bond markets.260
This partial market liberalization offers new opportunities for
foreign investors to tap China’s ever-growing domestic markets.
However, due to the strict curbs on the amount of money QFIIs
may invest and the length of time they can take the money out
of China, so far only a handful of foreign financial institutions
have expressed interest in apply for a QFII license.261
The foregoing overview of China’s current capital markets
demo nstrates that much remains to be done to increase both
market breadth and depth. Because of the novelty and complexity of securitization itself and the exotic nature of NPL securitization, there is a general lack of knowledge about the securitization concept and relevant principles. It is, therefore, not
surprising to expect that the demand for NPL backed securities
will be very limited. The participants in this market are likely
to be confined to institutional investors, which in the domestic
markets currently include commercial banks, insurance comp anies, pension funds, and fund management companies.262 However, even the demand of these domestic institutional investors
will be relatively small due to the few numbers of institutional
players and their capital constraints. 263 In addition, many of
these institutional investors are currently subject to strict limitations on their investment scope and can only invest in lowrisk instruments, such as treasury bonds.264 Another possibility
of demand for the Chinese NPLs comes from outside of the
country. Recently, some major international investors have
exhibited a rising interest in the Asian NPL market.265 These
large global players have been quite successful in countries
such as Japan, Korea and Thailand.266 They now seem to be
willing to shift part of their investment in the budding Chinese

260. Provisional Measures on the Administration of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors Investing in Domestic Securities (promulgated by CSRC &
PBoC, Nov. 5, 2002), available at http://www.isinolaw.com.
261. See China Limits Program on Foreign Investment, ASIAN W ALL S T. J.,
Dec. 2, 2002, at M2.
262. See Huang, supra note 227, at 2.
263. Id.
264. See China State Banks to Receive Extra Help On Bad Loans, C HINA
DAILY, May 2, 1999, available at LEXIS News.
265. See Richardson, supra note 214.
266. Id.
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NPL market.267 However, as discussed below, international investors still hesitate to allot large amounts of money in the
Chinese NPL market, mainly due to their concern with country’s unsophisticated and opaque regulatory regime.
VII. NPL SECURITIZATION IN CHINA: LEGAL AND R EGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
This Part first outlines the existing legal and regulatory
framework relevant to securitization, including laws governing
the areas of company, trust, contract, secured transaction, and
bankruptcy. It then identifies the current legal obstacles or
legislative gaps impeding NPL securitization. In addition, this
Part suggests enactment of special legislation to facilitate securitization.
China’s legal system does not specifically provide for asset securitization as a financial technique. However, Chinese comp anies have already successfully completed a few international
securitization transactions, which involved mainly future receivable cash flows of infrastructure projects268 as well as future
shipping receivables.269 The following discussion outlines the
legal framework within which a securitization transaction may
be structured.

267. See China Seeks Foreign Capital To Help Manage Domestic NPAs, ASIA
PULSE, Jan. 2, 2003, available at LEXIS news (pointing out that regardless of
their sizes, international funds begin to see a big potential for profits in
China’s NPL market). In addition to Huarong’s recently approved international auction, China Construction Bank is also seeking governmental approval to form a joint venture with Morgan Stanley to resolve bad assets with
a book value of about USD483 million. China Bank Seeks Aid Abroad, ASIAN
WALL S T. J., Jan. 10–12, 2003, at M3.
268. For example, in August 1996, Zhuhai Express Way Company, acting as
both originator and issuer, successfully completed a USD200 million bond
offering. The bond placement was secured by fees the Zhuhai municipal government collected from toll roads, bridges, and tunnels, as well annual vehicle
registration fees. See Banks See ABS As New Finance Tool, CHINA D AILY,
March 3, 1998, at 6.
269. In April 1997, China Ocean Shipping Company, a state-owned shipping
company, successfully securitied its future shipping revenues from its U.S.
and European business. Kong, supra note 175, at 240.
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A. Establishment of Domestic SPVs
Currently, Chinese law does not allow the establishment of a
special purpose corporation used in securitization transactions
of many other jurisdictions. The law presently permits Chinese
companies only to conduct their businesses within the scope
approved by the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”). 270 This strict ultra vires restriction raises difficulties in establishing an SPC within China.271 Given that
SPC’s purchase and sale of receivables are likely to be deemed
as financial services, SAIC will unlikely to issue a business license to an SPC, which usually has thin capital. 272
However, the 2001 enactment of Trust Law 273 makes it possible to use a special purpose trust to carry out securitization.
Although passing the Trust Law is a major legislative achievement, the “trust” concept is still new to China, as is to many
other civil law countries.274 Therefore, it remains to be seen
how the law will be applied and interpreted in the context of
asset securitization. For example, one issue would be whether
the beneficiary certificates issued by SPTs are considered securities.275

270. See Jonathan Zhifeng Zhou, Launch of the Securitization Market in the
PRC? Still a Long Way to Go, in S ECURITIZATION YEARBOOK 2000 18 (supplement to INT . FIN . L. REV ., Oct. 2000). See also, Gao Peiji and Paul Kruger,
China Faces Up to the New Challenges of Securitization, 19 INT’L FIN . L. REV .
29 (2000).
271. See Zhou, supra note 270.
272. Id.
273. ZHONGHUA REMIN GONGHEGUO XINTUO F A (Trust Law of the People’s
Republic of China), 9TH NAT’L PEOPLE ’S CONG ., 21ST S ESS ., S TANDING COMM.
(April 28, 2001), available at http://www.isinolaw.com. The Trust Law became
effective on October 1, 2001.
274. See Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, New Developments in Structured Finance, 56 BUS . L AW. 95, 128–129 (2000). [hereinafter New Developments].
275. Currently, China’s Securities Law does not provide for ABS in the definition of securities. Cf. Securitization Law Nears Passage, supra note 215
(stating that under Taiwan’s Financial Assets Securitization Statute beneficiary certificates issued by SPTs are classified as securities unless the Ministry
of Finance determines them to be short-term bills).
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B. Transfer of Receivables
Articles 79 to 81 of the new Contract Law effective on October
1, 1999 deal with transfer of receivables.276 Under the new law,
a creditor may, subject to limited exceptions, assign its contractual rights to a third party by serving a notice to the debtor of
such an assignment without first obtaining consent from the
debtor.277 This legal allowance greatly facilitates a receivable
transfer, which is a usual step in a securitization transaction.278
Such assignment, however, must be approved or registered in
accordance with any legal or regulatory relevant provisions if so
required thereunder.279 This requirement is significant to
prospective NPL securitization, in which transfer of stateowned assets are most likely to be involved. Since changes in
owne rship of state assets and valuations thus involved are
subject to complicated regulatory regime, NPL securitization
may very well require special approval by relevant agencies.280
C. Secured Credit Law
China’s Security Law passed in 1995 recognizes five types of
security: guarantee, mortgage, pledge, lien, and deposit.281 The
law provides that buildings, land use rights, and movable property such as machinery may be mortgaged.282 The law also contains provisions on mortgage registration and foreclosure.283
276. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO HETONG F A (Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China), arts. 79–81, translated in LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
COMM’N OF THE S TANDING COMM. OF THE NAT ’L PEOPLE ’S CONGRESS OF THE
PEOPLE ’S REPUBLIC OF C HINA, T HE L AWS OF THE PEOPLE ’S REPUBLIC OF C HINA
1999 9-76 (2000) [hereinafter CONTRACT L AW].
277. Id. art. 80. However, simultaneously transferring both the contractual
rights and obligations still requires the consent by the counter-party. Id. art.
88.
278. See Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 29–30; see also Zhou, supra note
270, at 18.
279. CONTRACT L AW, art. 87. See Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 30.
280. Id. at 30–31.
281. ZHONGHUA RENMIN G ONGHEGUO DANBAO F A (Security Law of the People's Republic of China) art. 2, 8TH NAT’L PEOPLE ’S CONG ., 14TH S ESS., S TANDING
COMM. (Oct. 1, 1995), reprinted and translated in CHINA L. & P RAC. 21 (Aug.
1995) [hereinafter S ECURITY LAW]. See also Kong, supra note 175, at 255.
282. S ECURITY L AW art. 34. See also Jerome Cohen & John Lange, The Chinese Legal System: A Primer For Investors, 17 N.Y. L. S CH . J. INT’L & COMP . L.
345, 370–71 (1997).
283. S ECURITY LAW arts 38-44, 53-58.
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However, the lack of procedures on registration and foreclosure
means that there is no effective protection against subsequent
purchasers’ claims absent notice of the security interest, and
that no efficient means of executing against collateral exists in
the event of a default on the underlying obligation.284
Provision of foreign-related security is subject to the Foreign
Security Procedures promulgated by PBoC,285 and Foreign Security Implementing Rules issued by Sate Administration of
Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”).286 The Foreign Security Procedure
recognizes only three forms of foreign-related security interest:
guarantees, mortgages, and liens.287 Under the Foreign Security Implementing Rules, any foreign-related security must obtain SAFE’s prior approval.288 Assignments of foreign-related
security rights would require prior consent of the security provider as well as SAFE approval.289
D. Bankruptcy Law
Although Chinese bankruptcy law is fragmented290 and under
review,291 general bankruptcy concepts are recognizable in the

284. Cohen & Lange, supra note 282, at 371.
285. Jingnei Jigou Duiwai Danbao Guanli Banfa [Administration of the
Provision of Security to Foreign Entities by Domestic Institutions Inside
China Procedures] (Sept. 25, 1996), reprinted and translated in C HINA L. &
PRAC. 37 (Mar. 1996) [hereinafter Foreign Security Procedure].
286. Jingnei Jigou Duiuwai Danbao Guanli Banfa Shishi Xize [Administration of the Provision of Security to Foreign Entities by Domestic Institutions
Inside China Procedures Implementing Rules] (Jan. 12, 1998), reprinted and
translated in C HINA L. & P RAC . 22 (Apr. 1998) [hereinafter Foreign Security
Implementing Rules].
287. Foreign Security Procedures, supra note 285, art. 2.
288. Foreign Security Implementing Rules, supra note 286, art. 3.
289. See Kong, supra note 175, at 256.
290. On the national level, there is the Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (for Trial Implementation), the Company
Law, which includes some bankruptcy-related provisions applicable to limited
liability companies and joint stock companies, and the Code of Civil Procedure, which includes some bankruptcy-related provisions applicable to legal
persons, including joint ventures and other foreign-invested enterprises. On
the local level, there are some other regulations relating to bankruptcy and/or
litigation. See Cohen & Lange, supra note 282, at 372.
291. It is expected that the long awaited, comprehensive new bankruptcy
law will be promulgated in the near future. Roundtable Discussion, supra note
229, at 22.
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existing regime.292 Under the various bankruptcy-related laws,
a creditor has the right to petition for a debtor’s insolvency.293
After the court’s declaration of bankruptcy, a liquidation committee created by the People’s court or a court has the power to
invalidate transactions occurring six months prior to the date of
the acceptance of bankruptcy proceedings by a Chinese court on
certain grounds.294 Secured creditors have priority rights in the
property of an insolvent debtor, preempting any competing
claims of unsecured creditors to the same debtor’s assets.295
If the debtor is an SOE, the bankruptcy petition is currently
subject to prior approval of relevant authorities.296 There may
be a two-year reorganization period initiated by authorities.297
If the debtor still defaults on its debt payment upon expiration
of reorganization, the court shall declare the debtor bankrupt.298
While creditors do have the ability to petition for the insolvency
of SOEs, for both practical and policy reasons, SOE bankrup tcies have been allowed only on an experimental basis and in
relatively limited numbers.299
E. Legislative Uncertainties
While structuring a securitization transaction within the present legal and regulatory framework is possible, significant
gaps exist, presenting substantial uncertainties to the success
of NPL securitization. First, although the Chinese laws appear
to recognize the concepts of perfection and priority,300 there is
292. Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 33.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. ZHONGHUA REMIN GONGHEGUO QIYE POCHAN F A (SHIXING CAOAN) (Law
of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation) (Dec. 2, 1986), translated in LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMM’ N OF THE
S TANDING COMM. OF THE NAT’ L PEOPLE ’S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE ’S REPUBLIC
OF C HINA, THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE ’S R EPUBLIC OF C HINA 684–95 (1998).
297. Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 33.
298. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 229, at 15.
299. See Cohen & Lange, supra note 282, at 371.
300. “Perfection” refers to protection of a transferee’s interest in transferred
assets from creditors of the transferor and from the transferor’s trustee in
bankruptcy. In a securitization transaction, perfection means to protect the
SPV’s interest in the transferred financial assets from claims of the originator’s creditors. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Language of CrossBorder Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT ’L L. 235, 240 (1998). In the U.S. arti-

File: CAO Base Macro Final.doc

608

Created on: 3/24/2003 7:12 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:27 AM

[Vol. 28:2

no clear guidance on how to accomplish a valid portfolio transfer in securitization where usually numerous obligors are involved.301 The Contract Law abolished the rule requiring a
written agreement for a contract of any kind.302 The law is silent, however, on whether notice of assignment to the debtor
must be given in writing and when such notice may be deemed
delivered to the obligors.303
Second, Chinese laws have yet to address the issue of a true
sale.304 Some uncertainty remains as to the treatment of recourse and the enforcement of a transferee’s right.305 It is unclear, for example, how the determination of a true sale would
be affected when a transaction employs certain credit enhancement mechanisms, such as provision of a guarantee by the
originator, or the existence of the originator’s right to any surplus collections.
Third, China’s existing legal system provides insufficient protection of creditors’ rights. For example, the enforcement of
cle 9 of U.C.C. provides that perfection is achieved by filing financing statements in jurisdictions where the debtor (originator) or the collateral is located.
“Priority” refers to the ranking of multiple claims to the same asset. In
bankruptcy, it refers to “a creditor’s right to have a claim paid before other
creditors of the same debtor receive payment.” BLACK’S L AW DICTIONARY 1212
(7th ed. 1999). Priority is ascertained by searching filing records to determine
whether other parties have prior filings against the relevant collateral or assets. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1995).
301. Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 33.
302. CONTRACT L AW, act 10.
303. Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 30.
304. A key to a securitization transaction is to complete a true sale as opposed to secured financing. See supra note 91.
Arguably, the issue of the SPV’s bankruptcy remoteness is less a relevant concern if the originator is a state-owned Chinese financial institution,
for example, an AMC, which is deemed usually unlikely to go bankrupt. However, in 1999, the Chinese central government refused to rescue the insolvent
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation (“GITIC”), which
was the second largest of its kind in China and owned by the Guangdong provincial government. See Lou, supra note 33, at n.18. See also, Ben Branch &
Fei Ji, Bankruptcy Practice in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan: A Summary,
2002 ANN. S URV . OF BANK. LAW 341 (2002). The GITIC’s bankruptcy raised
foreign creditors’ concern with the increasing possibility of the bankruptcy of
state owned financial entity as the government takes more sweeping financial
cleanup. See, e.g., Karby Leggett, China’s Credit Costs Go On Trial With
GITIC, ASIAN WALL S T. J., March 29, 1999, at J3, available at 1999WL
5430580.
305. Gao & Kruger, supra note 270, at 32–33.
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mortgage foreclosure is notoriously difficult. In addition,
China’s fragmented bankruptcy law does not provide an orderly
framework for the reorganization and liquidation of insolvent
enterprises.306 Furthermore, the judicial and administrative
discretion involved in the decisions to commence a bankruptcy
proceeding against an SOE debtor creates unpredictability in
the enforcement of creditors’ rights. Thus, the lack of experience in administrative proceedings further compounds the difficulty.
Additional uncertainties arise when foreign investors participate in China’s NPL resolution. Recently, the Chinese government issued two new regulations relevant to foreign investment
in NPL market.307 Obviously, the government has recognized
the importance of involving outside funds and expertise to resolve NPL issue as well as the closely related conundrum of
SOE restructuring. The multi-departmental regulatory regime
and opaque approval procedure, however, make it very difficult
to accomplish a transaction with foreign participation. In addition, there are also restrictions on the kind of SPVs that foreign
investors may set up to take over NPLs.308 Finally, foreign investors are concerned with China’s foreign exchange controls
imposed on profit repatriation.309
F. Proposal for Special Legislation
China currently does not have a comprehensive legal framework for carrying out securitization. Of course, given the manifested governmental support, the AMCs may well be able to securitize NPLs based on the existing laws and regulations. 310
This approach, however, lacks certainty and predictability, as
ad hoc interpretations of ambiguous provisions by various go vernment agencies may result in regulatory conflicts. Moreover,
306. Cohen & Lange, supra note 282, at 372.
307. Interim Rules on Financial Assets Management Companies’ Absorption
of Foreign Funds for Assets Reorganization and Disposal (promulgated on
Oct. 26, 2001 by MOFTEC, MOF, and PBoC); Provisional Rules on Reorganization of the State owned Enterprises by Using Foreign Fund (promulgated on
Nov. 8, 2001 by the State Economic and Trade Commission, MOF, SAIC, and
SAFE), available at http://www.isinolaw.com.
308. China Needs to Revise Laws, Provide More Transparency For NPL
Sales, AFX-ASIA (Nov. 5, 2001), available at LEXIS News.
309. Id.
310. Interview with Yang, supra note 6.
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validating every stage of a transaction would entail “a Byzantine process of obtaining consents and approvals from a panoply
of government bodies.”311 Thus, the AMCs may encounter substantial difficulty while e xperimenting with NPL securitization.
Therefore, enacting special legislation is the preferable approach to resolving uncertainties and to paving the way for securitization. In modeling this new securitization law, China
may borrow the asset securitization acts passed in Korea and
Taiwan. The new law could provide for securitization as a general financial technique and give special accommodation for
NPL transactions.
In establishing a comprehensive regime for securitization, the
proposed new law should fill the legislative gaps discussed earlier. For example, with respect to possible SPV structures,
China may choose to follow the Korean approach, providing for
both SPC and SPT, or the Taiwanese approach, which allows
only the use of SPTs. As for the true sale issue, China’s proposed law may specifically define the relevant criteria as in the
Korean legislation. Alternatively, the proposed law may leave
the issue open to the courts when disputes arise. The first option suffers from inflexibility, while the second approach flaws
with the unpredictability and may fail due to the current judicial incompetence in China. In addition, clear notice procedures
should be set up for perfecting an asset transfer. Notice should
be deemed given where certified mail has been sent to the obligor at the address appearing in the registration at the State
Administration of Industry and Commerce, or in absence of
that, to the last known address. If on at least two occasions the
mails have returned undelivered, a public notice published in
generally circulated newspapers should be deemed valid. Finally, to encourage international participation, the proposed
law should also provide for clear guidance on foreign-related
issues, including, for example, setting up of a foreign-involved
SPV, provision of foreign security, and repatriation of profits
overseas.

311. Balbir Bindra, Legal Initiatives to Promote Securitisation, available at
http://www.vinodkothari.com/secchina.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2003). For
example, Huarong’s first international NPL auction took a year to obtain approvals from all relevant authorities.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Resolving the mammoth NPLs burdening China’s fragile
banking sector is certainly a long march. Any procrastination
in implementing NPL disposals, however, could ultimately lead
to much greater fiscal burdens, due to the “ice cream effect.”312
The Chinese government has realized the seriousness of the
problem and has demonstrated considerable resolve in attac king it.
Securitization has been successfully utilized in the U.S., Japan, Korea, and many other countries as an option of NPL disposition. The Chinese AMCs mandated with NPL resolution
are currently exploring NPL securitization. As this Note has
suggested, however, the unique nature of Chinese NPLs, the
underdevelopment of its capital markets, and the lack of comprehensive legal framework present substantial obstacles to a
large-scale NPL securitization program in China. While the
bulk of Chinese NPLs are not suitable for securitization, this
Note indicates that of the massive portfolio held by the AMCs
certain loans are nonetheless securitizable. The Chinese AMC
may therefore embark on their pilot NPL securitization program from this identified portion of NPLs. Successful NPL securitization would not only contribute to the ultimate resolution
of China’s NPL issue , but would also assist the general development of securitization in the local markets.
To facilitate localization of this financial technique, the Chinese government must address the existing market and legal
obstacles. This Note thus stresses that the government should
further liberalize capital markets, allowing greater participation of both domestic and foreign institutional investors. In addition, this Note proposes enacting special securitization legislation to establish comprehensive and predictable legal infrastructures.
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312. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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